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ABSTRACT 
Pastoralist (herd ing) societi es in Africa are cla imed to be pr one to vio lence due to structural 
conditions of envi ronmental vu lnerability , scarcity of resources and decentral ized soc io­
political organizatio n. Thei r contacts with expanding state struc tures . and with neighbouri ng 
groUpS in di fferent socio-e con omie condi tions, are seen to add to ins tabili ty , due to the 
under lying hegemoni c project of national states , while major econo mic and demographic 
changes also playa rol e. This paper presen ts a comp arative overvie w of general fact ors that 
come into play in the ' production of confl ict' in and between pastoral societies, focusin g on 
Northeast Africa. It is co ntended tha t whi le conflict was a regu lar feature of life in 
traditional pastoral societ ies, its natur e and frequen cy have not ably chang ed in the 
confrontation with state forces, where by unresolved tensions betw een traditional and 
' modem' ju dicial conflict regulation mechani sms playa role. Extern al agencies approach 
these pastoral societies in conflict withou t paying prope r attention to the larger po li tica l­
econo mic contex t in which they operate and wh ich constra ins them in a polit ica l and 
Ideological sense. Some cas e ex amp les are adduced to make this point. The se and other 
case studies revea l that struc tura l insta bility in contemporary pas tora l soc ieties is usuall y not 
properly interpreted by ou tside agenc ies and is not easily 'r esolv ed' . 
The paper concludes with a gene ral model or checkli st of conditio ns and facto rs of confl ict 
production in pastoral societies . 
KEYWORDS: pastoralism, conflict, Ethiopia , state policy, reso urce sca rc ity, cult ure and 
' ethn ic ' difference , conflic t med iati on 
Introduct ion 
Conflicts in Africa are still widesp read and headl ine-catching, as in Somalia , the Uganda-D lc 
Congo border (LRA depredations ), Sudan (Darfur), Chad, Niger, N igeria, and E thiopia 
(Ogaden), reflecting the probl em atic basi s of statehood, governance and economic 
(re)d istribution, and in genera l ind icative of the unresolved problems o f deve lopmenta l 
' moderni ty' in a socio-political se nse. 
T his paper focuses the discussion ch iefly on causes of local conflict in pa sto ral 
herd ing societies in Northeast Afri ca, w ith key exampl es from Ethiop ia, bo th on the level of 
inter-ethn ic and intra-ethn ic relat ions . In the quest for ' solutions ' or for be tter use of 
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mediation and conflict resolution mechanisms, it is re leva nt to und erstan d the nature of the 
recurring conflicts in pastoral societies, both Intcm all y and , predominanrjy, In their relations 
with wider structures, notably state authorities and busi ness enterpri ses. 
These pastoral societies occupy large trac ts of terr itory , oft en in bo rder areas.! 
Among the causes for conflict are environmental factors, livelihood dec line , certain cultural 
values/traditions, and state economi c or other policies , which in various combinations 
impinge on dispute generation and confli ct behaviour. Co nflict preven tion , resol ut ion and 
mediation structures are now a favouri te subjec t o f inte rnationa l donor assistance 
pro grammes , and are useful to expl ore , but I will argue that the expecta tion s and ideals of 
co nfl ict resolu tion in Africa , are in general too optimistic because o f the growing 
int ractabil ity of conflicts. Man y of these conflicts, while locally roo ted in long-term 
gr ieva nc es and po wer struggles, tend to become enmeshed with state (trans)fo rmation 
processes as well as nati onal and globalized interests or ideologi es that are hard to manage 
and tend to be Imp osed on loc al societies. In addition, the wi ll and open nes s to med iat ion 
among many communities, even when induced to i1 by local elders or from abo ve, e.g. by 
state agents , seems to be in declin e. We see this in southern Somalia , Eri trea , and several 
parts of Ethiopia, when people pursu e local , sho rt-term interes ts and claim dominance. As an 
Ethiopian saying goes: "A king wanting reco nci liation can use a peasan t as mediator, but a 
peasant who does not want reconcil iation can 't eve n be re con ci led by a k ing" (So lomon 
1992 : 60). The fac t is indeed th at such people refusi ng concilia tio n (including ma ny 
pas tora lists) now are q uite common. 
In the co urse o f thi s paper I will foc us on some examples of pa storal societies that 
demon strate most of the fea ture s just ment ion ed, and are , in contrast to their trad it ional 
ima ge , far from iso la ted or rem ote but in the midst of today 's global strugg les . De sp ite these 
wider aspects , I will co nte nd that efforts at conflic t ana lysi s and of confl ict management or 
transformation - wh ich is oft en the mo st we can get - ha ve to start in the local setting and 
must address the immedia te prob lem s of the communiti es concerned . 
In anthropology and polit ica l Stu d ies there is a growi ng COnsensus on what facto rs are
 
involved in the generation of co nflict in pastora l herding so ciet ies in Afri ca (se e the first
 
column in the model in the Appendix), but no t on the interact ions between them and on the
 
trigger seq uences . E.g ., in man y cases , the scarci ty of pasture or wate r Sources in an are a
 
trad itionally sha red by at least two groups leads to tensions and fightin g (the popular
 
' resource competitio n ' theory , cf. Homer-Dixon 1999; Markakis 1998), but in documen ted
 
ot her ca ses result s in cooperat ion and agreements on regulated sha ring (Adano, et al. 2009).
 
So how is this explained? What are ele m enis induc ing pastoral gro ups _ or cla n or ter ritorial
 
groups within a pastoral soc iety - to tak e the path of accommodatio n instead of con fl ict ? An
 
an swer has to be so ught in the int eractive patt erning of conflict situa tions in specific areas,
 
pay ing attention to structural socio-e cono mic conditions, ava ilab le techn ology (in cluding
 
weaponry), cultural values (o r repertoires), and state polic ies . 
The soci o-ecollomi c basis of pastoralist SOcieties 
, While this paper IS partly based on field experiences in Southwestern Ethiopia in the late J 990s and 
early 2000s, I draw mostly upon secondary Sources and other document to make a more general 
argument. This IS why views and quotes from members of these pastoral societies are omitted here. 
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Pastoral land use in Africa is substantial and in ma ny countries close to ha lf the terri tory IS 
semi-arid lowland occupied by pastoral peoples. Examples are Somal ia , Sudan , Eth iop ia and 
Kenya. The population density is still re lati vely low in these regions, but, lik e mo st African 
countries, IS increasing fast. Average populat ion growth in Ethiopia and Ken ya, for Instance, 
has been c. 2 .6 to 3% annually, and pa storali sts share in this figure ) Past orali sts are rur al 
people who depend for their main livelihood on the herd ing of livestock mo stl y for 
subS istence and for trading of animal pr od ucts. Among many group s in southern Eth iopia the 
average herder fami ly has abo ut 30 -50 heads of cattl e Crop culti vati on is se condary and 
sometimes very limited, as they trade livestock or live stock products for food, e tc . in local 
markets. Ecological conditions in pastoral areas are by definition pr ecariou s - sea sonal 
pastures necessitating transhumanc e, i.e. much mobi lity and somew ha t r isky trave ll ing; over ­
dependence on insecure rainfa ll, resu lting in frequent drought ; underdeveloped hea lth or 
educational ser vice structures; and remoten ess from political and eco nomic po wer centr es . 
According to one pop ular paradigm , co nflict in pas to ra l societies is close ly tied to the se 
competitive ecologica l-economic co ndi tions of life in the sem i-arid zone where these peoples 
live: environme nta l resou rce scarc ity in , now um versal , conditions of pop ula tion grow th and 
shli nk ing of pastoral areas wou ld lead to con fl ict and viol ence be twee n the competin g gro ups 
- in sho rt, ' resource co mpetitio n breeds vio lence ' . Another paradigm, inherited fro m colonial 
percep tions, is tha t pas to ra l pe opl es are cultura lly predisposed to mili tan cy and violence , not 
only due to the harsh environment and the dangers the y face on an al mo st dai ly bas is (wi ld 
animal s, enemies ), but a lso due to their ideals of persona l va lour and of amassing lives tock 
'for its own sake ' - thi s wo uld th en expla in the ir incessan t ra id ing. In add ition , their 
' egalitarian-democratic ' society ba sed on kins hip and segme nta ry principles is o ft en see n as 
stimu lating their se lf-consc iously defended ide nt ity as independent people in area s where the 
central state was lo ng absent or at least quite weak in exerci sin g author ity. The S oma lis are 
often ment ioned as an example here. 
While these two paradigms , which cou ld b e called respectively "neo-Malthusian ' and 
the ' primord ialist' . carry grains of truth - e.g., there is environmental degradation an d 
dram ati c population growth, and group identities more and more tend to be held as rigid and 
essentialized - they are only elements of " necessary but by far not suff ic ien t cxp lanatio.i of 
the general and pers istent causes of conO ict in p astoral soc ieties. 
Wh at certainly can be sa id is thai pastoral societies are largely kin-ordered (lin ea ge s , 
clan s, etc . providing the basi s of social solidarity) , committed to defe nce of thei r livest ock 
herd s, very mobi le and ver satile, marked by low levels of technology (excep t, as \VC wil l see , 
in weapons) and vulnerable to the vagaries of precarious natural co nd it ions (Woldetensae 
2007) , state au thority (Hagmann & Alemrnaya 2008), and compe tition from neighbouring 
groups in sim ila r circum stances (cf. Meier, Bond & Bond 2007) . In this sen se , it see ms clear 
- and mus t be reco gnized in intervention policy - that in pastoral socie ties the thr esho ld s of 
.\ In 1974 Ethiop ia had c. 27 million people; a generation later, in 2009, an estimated 80 mln ­
showing an unprecedented growth rate. The figures from the 2007 census (CSA 2008) show that the 
zones and woredas in all the pastoral areas of the country have seen a doubling of population in the 
last 20-30 years. In imervrcws, pastoralists themselves often mention that they see strong population 
growth that cannot be accommodated within their current production systems. See also Sahlu 2003. 
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disputes and violent action are higher, which among them is accepted as such, and :1 
culturally encoded . This does not mean, as anyone living in such a soc iety for a longer 
period knows, that peop le in those groups are necessarily 'more violently predisposed ' ; it is 
mostly a question of the specific living conditions and power relations with their neighbours 
and the wider society having shaped them. 
The primordia list and the neo-Malth usian approaches emphasize causality of one set 
of factors instead of in the interaction between natural and ecological conditions on the One 
hand and cultural reperto ires and values - related to group identity - on the other. This 
interaction takes shape in the agency of local groups (in this case pastoralists) towards 
hegemonic state policie s as well as unrelenting demographi c growth, which reduces the ratio 
of people and livestock per unit of available land - a process that has been going on for many 
decades . The growi ng presence of the state is evident in most pastoral areas , trying to 
incorporate them politically and economically, although it is weak in the provision of 
services or in controlling the means of violence. This process has a great impact on local 
group relations and even on the pastoral economy (cf. Abbink 1997; Hagmann & Alemmaya 
2008). One of the visible consequences is the gradual expansion of the economic presence of 
the state, through new markets, taxation, and administrative demands . This is even the case in 
post- 199 1 federa l Ethiopia, where the official programme is local autonomy and 
decentralization of power, and that has led in effect to a strengthening of the state in all 
peripheral areas of the country , notably through processes of top-down cooptation. The 
policy package of the state includes sedentarization programs for pastora lists (and rangeland 
development), conversion of the communal grazing lands of pastoral groups (redefined as 
's tate land ' ) into private holdings for both richer herd owners and outsiders (for commercial 
enterprises") and given out in lease to foreign countries, with the state elite expecting to reap 
huge benefits"), as wel l as land alienation for othe r purposes. More than anything else, it is 
these processes that lead to a relative ' decline' or at least a weak ening of pastoralism: not the 
problems of the pastoral mode of production itself. 
'Ethnic' conflicts ? Culture difference and valu es in conflict 
Conflicts - certainly in pastoral societies - occur usually on a collective basis, not on an 
individual one. Individua l violent disputes are usually labelled criminal or pathological. The 
many recent violent conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and other countries are often said to 
be tied to the ethnic differen ces between the groups. Conflicts are rapidly extended to the 
entire ethnic group, seen as an extended or metaphoric kinship group. This is the case even 
though an incident may have started between individuals of herd ing groups in a small local 
context. In the last eighteen years in ethno-federal Ethiopia, numer ous violent clashes are 
described as being between such ethnic or territorial units that cherish a separate identity 
(Nuer-Anywa, Borana-Garri , Somali-Borana, Guj i-Borana, Afa r- Issa , Afar-Karrayu, Suri­
Anywa, Suri-Dizi, Hamar-Borana, etc .; cf. Abbink 2006 ; Dereje 2006; Asnake 2009; Yasin 
2008) . Historically, these groups indeed often have different ritual and cultural tradition s and 
" Cf. the study ofTckele et al . 1994. 
l See Paul Vallely 2009. 
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languages or dialects, but shared much of the pastoral ways of life and their dealings with the 
natural environment. They also had well-establi shed traditions of conflict regulation that were 
based on debate, mediation, compensation and ritual reconciliation via a ceremon y of 
blessings and oaths and jo int consumption of sacrificed animals. Cultural differences between 
pastoral groups were not a major cause for dispute or violence, as they shared much of the 
same challenges and values concerning male behaviour, gender relations, religious notions, 
rain rituals, etc. Some groups in conflict could even be considered part of the same peop le or 
linguistic community. The level of ' tolerance' toward violent action to redress perceived 
wrongs was higher among pastora l groups than among others, and although there were 
perhaps certa in codes of fighting (see Musa 1998 for the Somali of the past), there was a 
perception that some problems were better solved with forceful and violent action than with 
talking and negotiation. 
Among some ethnic groups, e.g., the Guj i-Oromo (Taddes se 2009: 194), the Macca­
Oromo (Bartels 1983: 229, 257); or the Bodj-Me'en (see Fukui 1979 for an influential stud y), 
there were or are ideals of spec ific violent performance and even cognitively rooted 
representations of violent action that had cultural value in the society. Having killed a large 
wild animal, e.g , lion or buffalo, or a human from another (ethnic) group enhanced the 
culturally required killer ' s status among peers, and was sometimes also required in orde r ( 0 
qualify for marriage (the 'meritorious complex ' ; cf. Braukarnper 2002). The discourse of 
boasting and 'achievement ' in having killed others that is prevalent among sections of the 
young generation in many of these pastoral peoples (but not only them) should not be 
underestimated . Among others, for the Nuer or the Karimojon g (cf. Simonse 2005: 25 1) it 
has been argued that the raids on neighbouring groups were deemed necessari ly to 
accumulate sufficient livestock for the young (male) generation to be independent and to 
many (high bride-wealth). Whi le these ideals are variable and can undergo change, they were 
at some point quite influential as motivational dispositions towards violent behaviour and not 
easy to prevent. Generational opposition or tension would then under certain conditions be an 
Independent cause for violent behaviour. 
The differences between pastoral peoples and sedentary agriculturalists " 'ere 
significant and visible , often expressed in mutu ally antagoni stic images (of the ou- :I" S 
inferi ority or backwardness). Ideals on personhood and performance also diverged strongly. 
as did patterns of leadership and authority (cf. Abbink 2004 on Sun and Dizi contlict). While 
mediation structures also existed between them (e.g. for dealing with cases of cattle 
damaging field crops) and disputes were resolved via new agreements and compensation was 
paid, these structures in many cases are on the decline, or have come under pressure by 
interfering outside forces in recent decades. Notably in the inter-ethn ic, as opposed to the 
intra-ethnic, domain the)' have lost force. The Sudanese region of Darfur is the most evident 
example of this (cf. Flint & De Waal 2005, p. 58; Daly 2007 , p. 266). but as ethnographic 
studies and NGO research reports have suggested (see e.g. Wairagu 2007: 45: Yohannes et 
al. 2005; Abbink 2000), also in Kenya and Ethiopia such structures were neglected or lost 
status, either because of changing local power balances and new linkages to wider outside 
networks. or due 10 misguided state appropriation of local media tion and biased intervention 
(ef. Ayalew 2001: 181, 183). 
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Hence, while these mediation structures still exist (or at least the idea that they 
should be used), and indeed are often cherished by local socie ties, there is a development 
toward their devaluation. This points to the fact that more than cultur al or ethn ic differences 
per se being the cause of growing violent conflict, it is often the interference of the 
centralizing state that in itself is a major disturbing factor. In its efforts to establish political 
hegemony and economic advantage, it subverts autonomy and custom ary dispute resolution 
procedures, co-opting them and introdu cing bribes and bias in the local system, and the state 
also tends to appropn ate pastoral land resources without proper alternatives or 
compensation." This process is accompanied by a disco urse of dif feren ce and cultura l 
denigration that is still prevalent, and which inevitably leads to new grievances, disput es, and 
often violence. Even if there would be real material issues at the base of gro wing conflicts, 
such as shrinking pastures, land grabs, closing of acces s routes, state repr ession and 
population or livestock growt h exceed ing the carry ing capaci ty of the trad itionally exploited 
areas o f a group.' leading to ' resource competition' (cf. Getachew 200 I: 96-97), it depends 
on the traditions of conciliation and on judicial state po licy whether conflict behaviour takes 
root or not. In addition, new formations of power and bureaucracy may simp ly preclude the 
effective recourse to customary , local-level conflict resolution mechanisms, as the ideological 
econom ic and judi cial dependence of rural populations on the state structures is growing. 
In Ethiopia there is the special case that the political system since 1991 is structured 
along ethni c lines", with many regions and districts led by a dominant ethnic elite; and when 
dispute s arise on borders, wells or oth er matters, the local administration takes the side of ' its 
own group ' , whatever the j udicial merits of the case . These thoroughly 'e thnicized ' political 
arenas breed instabil ity and a pol itics of ' trench warfare' . The model has led to the rapid 
escalation of local conflicts along reconstructed ethnic lines, which were then subsequently 
declared ' the cause' of the conflict. 
As one example I briefl y discuss here the recent Borana-Garr i conflict. Here we see 
that economic. polit ical. environmental and ' cultural' factors merge. leading to notions of 
ethni c identity defin ing the contours of the dispute. 
In February 2009 deadly clashes occurred between the Borana Oromo and the 
Garri pastoral groups. whereby c. 300 peop le were killed and 70,00 0 fled their 
6 The latest threat Insouthern Ethiopia is the plan to build a huge dam, Gilgel Ill, in the Omo River, 
of which the future effects on local pastoral peoples (not consulted) seem grave. See Greste 2009. 
Another new development endangering the indigenous basis of agrarian and pastoral economies is the 
giving out of large tracts of land, notably in Ethiopia, (0 foreign concessionaries or countries, not 
intending to produce for the local market but for their own, i.e., overseas. This development will have 
a major impact on Ethiopian rural society, e.g., implying severance of the bond of the local people 
with the land, alienation from their social and cultural 'capital' , and, at the most, employment of a 
part of them as low paid wage labourers. The agrrcultural demonstration effect of the foreign 
producers on Ethiopian rural producers will be minimal. because they will not have a "developm ent 
role For a study, see Cotula, et al. , 2009. 
) The decline of ' carrying capacity' is shown by the persistent out migranon of (impoverished) 
membersof these societies or of those who have lost rights of access to land and cattle, and their 
search for wage labour or other sources of livelihood elsewhere. 
S Constitutional ly, sovereignty lies not in the Ethiopian people, but in the ' nations, nationalities and 
peoples' of Ethiopia (Constitution, Art. 8.1). 
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homes. According to a BBe news message", it was apparen tly triggered by the 
construction of a new borehole. The Borana live in the Ororniya Region al State; 
the Gam, a less numerous pa storal group of mixed Somali and Oromo orig ins, 
live along and across the border of this State WIth the Somali Regiona l State (of 
Ethiopia). 
Th is was not the first confli ct between them, and a clash in 2000 WIth many 
peop le killed and displaced ;" had apparently not been followed by an effective 
peace or reco nciliation agre ement. While in the past these two groups were not 
good friends either, such numb ers of victims and such a leve l of destruction and 
expul sion were not known before. 
The Garri this time attacked Borana settlements at night , killed every one they 
met, destroyed and burnt the villages and cattle camps, and raided tho usands of 
livestock. The past two years rainfall had been very bad , and lack of water and 
pasture were crea ting hardship among the two peop les. The new water borehole 
had ju st been cons tructed by the Oromiya regional governm ent for the Borana, 
and there was none for the Gam (who are in another state). In their attack, the 
Gam also destroyed the drillin g rig. Much of the raided cattle was brought across 
the border to Kenya and sold there, impossible to retrieve. 
One Borana witn ess of the attack said: 
"The y came on foot, without veh icles, but they had bombs and missile launchers, 
and at that time we didn't have guns, only sticks to defend ourselves " . 
"They didn't want us to live well, and water is very important to us, so they 
attacked our water source." II 
One local Borana po litician was quoted as saying: "The Soma lis [meaning the 
Gam , JA) are problematic peop le" . .... 
"They are a lways push ing us. It's as if I give you a place to pitch your lent and 
the following morn ing you are telling me to leave; the Borana are not accepting 
that ." 
In the absence of effective trans -eth nic media tion or compensation mecha nisms, 
the conflict saw no solution yet and Borana swore to take revenge. In this 
respect, the Borana were rep orted to be stockpiling weap ons, and in response , the 
Garri did the same. Gov ernment forces are for the time being stationed between 
the two groups, but no effec tive peac e procedures are yet in place. 
Several familiar elements are evident here: traditional tension between two ethno ­

linguistically d ifferent groups (cultural differe nce), hardship due to drought (ecology) , the
 
new, ill-defined regional bord er dividing previously shared, ' open' pastu re lands of two
 
groups (politics), government poli cy of drillin g wells in one place , but not in ano ther
 
9 E Blunt, ' Water pipe sparks Ethiopian conflict' , BBC news, 12 March 2009 (online:
 
http://news.bbc.co.ulv'2''hi/afr ica/7929104.stm, accessed 17-03-2009.
 
I" In 2UOO there was a violent clash between the rwo groups, then with c. 140 people massacred,
 
Inc luding women and children, and hundreds displaced (see Abdurahman Arne 2006: 5).
 
II See precedmg footnote. 
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(politics), a high number o f victims in a few days due to the use of large quan tities o f mod em 
automatic nfl es (new arms technol ogy ':', d ifferenti ally introdu ced amo ng, or acce ss ib le to , 
the local gr oup s), and the possible comm ercialization of raiding, as th e catt le we re part ly sol d 
in distant markets, to out sid ers (economics ). In short , opportu nity structures for con flict are 
more prevalen t, due to different po sition ing of the gro ups vis-a-vis the sta te, and du e to 
durab le, structu ra lly entrenche d d isputes about: (access to) materi al resources, p ol itical and 
legal power, access to economic opportu nities ( includ ing ma rkets ), and abou t the re lati ve 
socio-culture ranking of groups w ithin a context that ge ts more pervasive. Grou p identity, 
so lid ified with a po li ticized appeal to 'ethnicity ' (behereseb ident ity), is marsh all ed to dra w 
the line s, even if factu al cu ltural di fferences we re qui te limited. 
Types and pal/em s ofconfl ict 
ln the type of societies under di scu ssion , con flicts are o f a specific , historically well-att ested 
kind . They often follow simil ar lines or cyc les . Three types of confl ict can be d istinguished, 
w ithout sug gesti ng that the line s and op pos itions are alw ays c lea r o r foll ow neat ' ethnic 
lines ' . 
a) Wit hin pa storal gr oups. 
Conflicts between pastoral peop les hav e often a long h istory and show elements of ' balanced 
exchange ' (negat ive recip rocity), characterized by repet itive violent inc idents (ra ids, attacks) 
but also corrective mechanism s of peace-m aking. Some affinities between confl ic ting groups 
are mutuall y recogni zed , based on s im ilari ties in the ir way o f li fe and their cus toms, e .g ., 
thei r soc io-cultural focus on cattle or came ls and certain ri tu al-reli giou s beliefs . But despite 
occasio nal cooperative agr eements in tim es of unexpected adversity affecting them both, 
different pastoral peo p les usually vie for pasture, liv estock (ra ids in times of local drought, 
meant to replen ish lost herds) and wa te r sources. Ne verth eles s, co nquest and dri ving out 
others was rare , let a lone massi ve killing. In Africa th is p icture is changing, however , s ince 
the late j 980 s, whe n pastoral gr ou ps occas ionally started to push ou t othe rs due to th eir larger 
numbers, better arm aments, or selective state support (ag ain, Dar fur' s pastoral- nomadic 
group s are a goo d ex ample) . As noted, in all so cieties , certain ly in Northeast A fri ca , 
customary disp ute or con flict resolut ion procedures seem to be under pressure. so that th e 
state is more and more expected , o r reluctantl y ca lled in , ' to resto re o rder' - and often a fte r it 
had po sit ioned itself as a pl ayer ben t to establi sh hegemony and pur sue its own int erests 
A clear tendency nowad ays is that confl ict sta rt s not so mu ch along communal/ethni c 
line s b ut mo re along generatio nal an d ind ividu al line s: not the ethn ic groups as a whole battle 
another or have a strategy of expa nsion, but some indi viduals or soc ial strata w ithin a gro up ­
such as a young gen erat ion o r age gro up - perpetrate the violen ce. However , in its tum it 
leads to the gra dual mobilizat ion of larger units of the same peopl e. Some pastoral pe op les 
have, however, due to populat ion increase and regional migra tions, divided into sec tions that 
comba t one an other as if they were separa te 'ethnic ' groups . Th e Karimoj ong of Uganda, for 
instance, a soc iety flooded by au toma tic weapons, see m now to be irretrie vab ly split into 
th ree antagonist ic groups : the Matheniko, Pian and Bokora (Simonse 20 05: 25 0) , who rai d 
and kill each other and do neith er app eal to compensation pr ocedures nor reconcile . 
b) Between pastoral groups an d sed en t ary farming populations. 
I' See, for instance, Mkutu 2003 and 2007; also Mirzeler & Young 2000 for the Karimojong case. 
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In man y con flic ts betwee n pastoral gro ups and sedentary -ag ric ultural peo ples , noti ons of 
moral comm unity and affinity are often not extended to th e oppo nent. The conflicts are more 
tenaci ou s and irrec oncil able. Ap art from histor ical enmity du e to past camp aign s of vio lent 
state formation by large pastoralist peoples (c.g ., the Ful ani states in Wes t Afr ica ) and 
recurri ng structural oppositions between ways of lrfe and livelih ood system s, ther e are o ften 
add itional cultural difference s , suc h as lan guage, traditi ons o f origin , auth ori ty stru ct ur es , 
presti ge ran king, religious trad ition, and li fe-cycle ritual s. These can lead to cngr ained 
cultural perceptions of ' difference ' tha t are act ively cherished as ' good' or 'bad ' and , despi te 
overlapp in g zones of similarity and shared activit ies , are still socially reprodu ced on both 
sides. 
In many case s, vio lent co nflic t now typ icall y takes the form of ra ids by pastorali sts 
on sedentary peasan t cult ivators an d their fiel ds or villages , who are vuln erable . ' 3 In th is 
pattern of conflict, expl oited by the Sudanese state elite, ha s led to the de vast a tion o f an en tire 
region and its sys tems of liveli ho od (cf. Daly 2007). These raid s, for a var iety of rea sons , 
make many victims, and the me agre possession s o f the cultiva tors (a few heads o f livestock , 
cloth ing, o r mo ney) are taken an d often leave th em des titu te . Ret al iat ion is usu ally 
impossib le , be cause the peasants are less well- arm ed and more under the control of the 
government. In pre-state conditio ns, the re was o ften a delicate , negot iat ed (c ontrac tua l) 
balance be twe en the se tw o k inds o f groups, w ith right s and dut ies as we ll as some ri tual 
complementarity clearly de fined. These notions are now largel y ero ded, an d conflict betw een 
sedentary farm ers and past oral gr ou ps tends to evolve into cyc lical local wa rfa re. Eco nomi c 
relations, not to speak of inter-marriages , are th en declining steep ly. The Darfur sit uatio n is a 
prime example (cf Prun ier 2005 ; Dal y 200 7). Ethnic ste reotypes gain the upper hand and 
become a facto r in enemy ima ges and further co nflict behav iour. 
c) Between the state and local groups. 
In many Afric an countries the state is weak and dys functiona l, not pro vid ing services or 
effective lega l redress to citizens, but it is st ill expanding its administrative and mi li tary 
presence in many formerly outlyi ng areas . The aims are political and econom ic: stab ilizarion 
of border areas, co ntro ll ing o f insurgent activities, and ope ning up lan d for ex ternal 
investment or resource ex trac tion 14 and tak ing a share of profits and taxes. T he dev elopu .cnt 
of game parks for tourism is also one exampl e; having recentl y created problems an d 
controversy, e. g. in sou thern Ethiopi a (cf. the experiences with the EU funded National Pa rks 
project, 1994 -1998 , and the Afric an Pa rks Foundation, 2004-2008) , Local people in margi nal 
pasto ral area s are seldom consul ted, and are confron ted w ith state encl osure s , hun tin g bans 
I ' During my fieldwork period among the Sun agro-pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia in the 1990s, 
many such raids were carried out on Dizi villages. Markakis (2004: 26) mentions a raid of the Pokot 
on the Marakwct III northern Kenya, where 50 Marakwet were killed. The list of such conflicts IS 
long. The Darfur war is marked by a consistent and organized pattern of destructive attacks of 
pastoralists (or former pastoralists), augmented by state-supported militias of bandit s and robbers, on 
the sedentary farming populations In central Darfur. 
" One example among many is the campaign of the state authorities III Niger against the Tuareg in 
the north because it wants to mine the uranium found in their area. See e.g., the ' SSC news message 
'Niger's Tuareg rebels demand share of uranium cash' , 23 July 2009, accessed 10 August 2009 at : 
(hnp:l/www.reutcrs.com.article/ latestCrisis i idUSL20 182 175) 
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and prohibitions on rnobiht y. When clashes occur between two pastoral groups or a pastorall 
group and a fann er group. the gove rnment often comes in too late and lets the con flict rage 
on before efforts at mediation or settlement are attempted . A state-sponsored peace ceremony 
or agreement is often incomplete and does hardly set about to solve the underlyin g long-term 
probl ems, because for addressing them political reform and costl y polici es for development 
are needed. 
Many of the prob lems between groups relate the heritage of colonia l borders , across 
which pastoral groups move to exploit traditional seasonal pasture land, although they are 
formall y not allowed to do so any longer as nominal citizens of another country. Long-term 
ecological and political developmen ts or decisi ons have had economic consequences that 
induce people to take action or to resist, sometimes in violent ways. But there is also the 
persistent view by outside rs that pastoralists live in quite differ ent spaces, far from 
' civilization' . 
Common forms of violent action among pastoral populations as well as sede ntary fann ing 
people (although the latter more oft en as victims) are: 
* livestock raiding 
* attack on villages 
* targeted or random killings 
" ambushes to rob people 
* attacking traders or travellers going to the markets, and 
* abductions. 
When disputes arise, the impul se among the contending parties nowadays is often not to send 
a delegat ion and ask for discussion and negotiation through established channels, but to 
'crea te facts ' by acts of viole nce, to intimida te, eliminate or to chase out people from 
disputed areas by one of the mean s or tactics just mentioned (see also the model in the 
Appendix). Thi s leads to spirals of violence that are not easily broken . not even by customary 
ritual leaders or religio us figures. A neglected issue of attentio n here is the nature of the 
violence perpetrated in contempo rary conflicts: ' new ' forms of abuse and cruelty in fighting 
often create deep psychological scars and implacable hatred amon g people. Conflicts in 
additi on often lead to damaging livelihood prospects, as fields cannot be safely cult ivated. 
with food scarcity the result. and livestock cannot optimally access essen tial grazing areas, 
leading to their weakening and often death. 
The impact of state policies and trails-border link ages of'pastoralist conflicts 
While no one doubts that the modem state, also in developing countries, has a prime role to 
play in de-escalating con flicts, maint ain justice, and invest in service prov ision and 
' development', there are conditions that make all this difficult. For exampl e, a problem for 
state authorities is to effectively counter-act long-term eco logical and economic changes in 
the pastoral areas : there is climate change , less rainfall, demographic expansion, and periodic 
livestock disease. There are trans-border conflicts or civil wars impacting on neighbouri ng 
groups , including the rapid spread of modern arms, often procured in one country and used in 
another. The impact of the southern Somalia conflicts on Ethic-Somali border areas is one 
example ; the expansion of the Nuer in the Ethio-Sudanese border area (Garnbe la), threatemng 
the Anywa people, another. 
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In many pastoralist areas, state author ities have given up the semblance of exerc ising 
consensual authority, and ' rule' by force and vio lence (Darfur, north ern Uganda , the Ogaden, 
northeast Kenya), although claims to sovereign power over the areas are not given up . As 
noted above, in other areas in.habited by pastoral peoples, state authority and its poli c ing 
functions are gradually expanding in symbolic and material from (offices, police stations, 
erc.). although they are neither very efficient nor fair. 
Incorporation of the marginal pastoral areas is thus often part of a state (re)bui lding 
process, whereby cooptation and control are seen as essential. Th is policy from above has 
political and economic consequences , e.g. ove rall disempowerrn ent of local people in their 
own areas , resented by past oralists for pol itico-economic and cultural reasons. Trans-border 
economic activities - e.g., transhurnan ce or livestock trade - are often also hindered by the 
state authorities, with the intent to control them and collect taxes, but the effect is to redu ce 
the potential economic local benefits, to disturb customary patterns of exchange, and 
introduce an often arbitrary ' legality ' of certain economic pra ctices. In additi on , land 
expropriations for external investment are often made without consultation of local peop le, 
let alone compensation. The cultural hegemony of state policy and its civili zational narrati ves 
or ideology leads in many cases to predictable depreciation of local traditions. A pr ime 
example is the sta te prohibit ion, some years back, of ceremonia l stick duelling - deemed 
'vio lent' - among the Suri people in southwest Ethiopia, or the interference of the Ethio pian 
state in Borana-Oromo ritu als such as the gumi gaayyo, a big init iation and generation-set 
ceremony held every eight years (The last one was in 2004) . Th e authorities then descend on 
the Borana ceremonial meeting place with a host of officia ls and media people seemingly to 
' annex' this event , intendi ng to determine much of the proceed ings and to advise on ' policy 
outcomes' . This seems to show a lack of respect for an important local cultural trad ition and 
incon ectly puts political demands on it. 
At the same time, the state authorities have great difficulty or reluctance in i",,,·cs:i:-.g 
in educational, medical, infras tructural and other facilities in the pastoral areas, or to put 
acceptable political mechanisms in place that prevent conflict or effecti vely allow medianon 
111 cases o f emerging disputes. There is much scope for taking the pastoral areas more 
seriously in this respe ct, all the more so because pastoral peop le link up with their ethnic or 
regional brethren across national borders (Somali, Afar, Gabbra, Maasai, etc.). 
In their dealings with pastorali sts, state authorities would also do bett er to recognize 
the relative autonomy of pas toral peoples, both politically and economically . Sedentary rain­
fed agricul ture will not be possible in the pastoral areas and in general livestock herding is 
more viable there than other agra rian pursuit s. This means for example that the usual plans 
for the "sedentarization' of pastoralist peop le should be modified. The state should also, 
perhaps with NGO assistance, institute confl ict warning systems and establish a work ing 
local j ustice system that utilizes both the appea ls to local customary mechanisms of dispute 
resolution as well as to a modem court system. If these things are in place, then the rationality 
of appealing to them, instead of grabbing the gun, is more evident. Donor countries have 
provided funding for such initiatives, but they have not been effectively used or moni tored. 
In sum, the state authorities might be called upon to recognize the spec ificity of 
pastoral problems and their wider impact on sedentary populations, and enhance the politi cal 
representati on of pastoralists in over-arching structures (cf. Lister 2004 ) so that they can build 
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local alliances and become partners in developing policies more towards compromise and I-­
coopera tion with their sedentary neighbours. In Ethiopia, this is partly happening on ~~~ I 
regIOnal and zonal levels, where pastoral representa tives are gradually more visible 
allowed t o all' their views. Developing policies on the . ground, however , also r equ~r:~ 
recogm zing the useful practical role of local (and up to a pomt, international) NGOs. " 
.Traditiona l ' conflict management Procedures: p rosp ects and realities 
A start to conflict management , or rather transformation of conflict into manageable 
structures, is to depart from the immediate concern 0 f the parties in a specific conflict: what 
are the casualties and the damage, how do they dis cursively frame their problems and I 
oppos ition to others in a historical perspective, and trying to weigh who tells what version of 
the disp utes and why. The traje ctory of conflict can be analysed in event sequences and 
against the background of contextual factors, like (see the model in the Appendix) the long. 
term conditions of inequali ty, marginalization, environmental stress (Meier, Bond & Bond 
2007). and problemat ic state policies of hegemony and incorporation. The third step is to 
reconstruct the ' trigger even ts' , or the immediate agency of those involved, and address them 
concretely. Here decision-theory is needed: who initia tes/decides on violent action, who joins 
and why? 
In view of the pre carious long-term political-e cological conditi ons of pastoral and 
agro-pastoral groups in Afri ca, it is impossible to expect that they will no t be in confl ict in 
the foreseeable future . But the puzzle or the cause for worry is the pressure on the mediation 
struc tures , of procedures of agreement-re aching and of shared action that could maintain or 
restore (some of) the common economic activities (e.g., sharing wells, dry season pastures, 
use of stretches of bush or forest) that the groups customarily resorted to, and to a large 
extent still do (cf. Desalegn et al. 2005 ; Lemma 2008; Ahmed & Yarcd 2008) . Here the 
modem states in the Hom of Africa have mostly failed , either in ' early warning' and polic ing 
or in taking the problems and emerging violent conflicts of these groups seriou sly - probably 
becaus e the latter were seen as located in 'marginal', ill-serviced areas, of no direct poli tical 
significance to the state . As the persisten t Ogaden conflict in southeast Ethiopia (a new round 
of violent confrontations started in 2007, and is still going on) has shown, this was a great 
miscalc ulation: pastoral group s are more and more involved in trans-border resistance 
movements, criminal activities (commercial catt le rustling), and perhaps also in radical­
milit ant (if not terrorist) activities: see the Ogaden National Liberation Front's (ethnic 
Somalis) attack in April 2007 on an oil exploration site in Ethiopia , killing 74 people in cold 
blood ; activities of Somalis in the Kenya and Ethiopia frontier areas (cf. Osambia 2000); the 
Darfur-Chad rebel and criminal movements; or the Karirnojong disturbances in northeast 
Uganda (Simonse 2005). 
Phase one of a polic y towards conflict resolution is to study (remnants of) tradit ional 
mechanisms of mediation and examine how they cou ld be revived or given new leases of life, 
perhaps with new externall y provided incentives. Externally imposed top-down measures, 
like the massive use of force, have a temporary clamp-down effect but rarely a beneficial 
long-term impact. Phase two might be a bringing together of local pastoral groups or peoples 
I ~ In Ethiopia this is now a big problem because of a new law (of 2009)severely restricting if not 
crippling the activities and mandates of NGOs in the country. 
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in arenas of discussion. In fact, this kind of development is occurring in southern Eth iopia in 
,he past five years, where some NGOs have successfully stimulated pastoralists to take the 
initiative in a series of meetings, where issues of conflict and peace-making could at least be 
discussed (see AEPDA 2008 , IRlN 2009), and tn some instances have led to a mm gauon of 
specific local confl icts. 
COI/elusioll : towa rds the accept ance an d managem ent of structural instability 
As was noted at the start of this paper, expec tations of conflict resolution in areas of conflict. 
notably in marginal pastoral areas, are in general too high-strung. Underlying ecological­
economic, political and cultural problems arc long-term and persistent , and local political 
culture in deve loping countries in Afr ica is largely authoritarian and state-cen tred , not geared 
10 the effective flow and use of local traditi ons or initiatives. Cycles of conflict are often the 
result. lt is sensib le to start with the recognition that in pastoral areas the relati ons among 
pastoral groups themselves, as well as between pastoral peop le and cultiva tors or state agents, 
are structurally unstab le. Mirzeler & Young (2000: 426) even have talked about the 
Karimojong as a situation with ' a stable from of disorder' . But sometimes new rules of access 
to resources and balances of power can emerge from persis tent violent conflict (cf. Unruh 
2005). 
The role of the state can of course be important in contributing to conflict 
management (cf. Yohannes e l al. 2004: 34-35). But it must be seen as one partn er , and must 
rather provide the wider normative and institutional framework for devel opin g so lutions, but 
not prescribe them with armed force and administrative rigour from above, Po licies that tie in 
with local views and initiatives, find socio-cultural resonance, and appea l to trans-group 
cooperation in areas of common interest (e.g., common property managemen t) are to be 
stimulated. As said, there are also initiatives from within pastoral peop les themselves to at 
least start addressing problems. Th is was evident in Decemb er 2007 in the large meet ing of 
representatives of I7 pastoral peop les in the Sudan- Ethiop ia border area, held in Kangaten, 
southern Ethiopia." Only by patien tly building on the results of such mee tings can any 
headway be made in addressing conflic t and its underl ying causes , as we ll as in refl ecting on 
the revival or adaptive reconstruction of (customary) dispute resoluti ons acceptable to all. 
I. See lR11\ news message, ' Ethiopia: healing the scars of conflict', 17 December 2007 (online: 
w ww irinnews.org/Report.aspx'.'Reportld=75843). See also the report of AEPDA 2008, cited above. 
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APPENDIX: Sketch of a gener ative mode of violent conflict (in pastoral societies) 
Iufrast ruetur a l conditions and root cau ses 
(longue dude factors) 
Economic inequality 
Political marginalization 
Direct, visible exploitation by outs iders 
Erosion of customary dispute resolution 
mechanisms 
Limited or blocked market access 
Land alienation (by state or companies, e.g.
 
for national parks)
 
Disputed border location
 
Genera tional opposition (young vs. old)
 
Cultural traditions validating aggressive
 
action (initiation, raiding, masculinity ideals)
 
Environmei uai deprivatio n or degradation,
 
due \0 natural or political-economic causes
 
State incorporation, or appropriat ion
 
of local powers, e.g. of traditional 
mediators or local ritual leaders 
-) 
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Precipita ting or pro ximate causes 
(short-cycle factors) 
Bad leadership: internal or by state agents 
Development project interventions 
High number of livestock deaths due to disease 
or ep i d~m i~ 
Commercial livestock raids (fuelled by 
outsiders) 
Sharp increase,in the spread of modern arms 
(automatics) 
Lack of rainfall causing acute crisis: drought 
and/or food scarcity 
Play upon ethno-culrura) difference 
via (in)forma l ranking and inferiorization 
Humiliating actions of non-group members 
vis-a-vis cultural traditions or specific custom, 
Cases o f abuse or bios in the legal system 
agoinst a group, and lack of protective and 
policing activity 
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Positive intervening f actors: 
• Appeals and de-escalating actions by ritual leaders or.elders 
• pre-emp tive action by neutral Slate agents 
• mediating role of local or foreign NGOs 
• trans-group co llective action by women' s'groups 
I
 
I
 
Triggers: 
- group monopolization of wells 
- raids on cattle 
- inter-group hom icide 
- village raid 
- revenge attack 
- abduction/abuse of females or children 
· state land grab 
- state repressive measures/campaigns 
• territorial infringement 
Negative intervening fa ctors: 
Individual criminal acts 
Specific divide-and-ru le tactics by 
Incitement by either outsiders or b'TOUp members 
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